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The British left needs to start taking Ulster Unionism seriously, listening 
and engaging with its concerns, history, and political character. 
 
To many on the British left, Northern Irish Unionism is self-evidently on the losing – 
and wrong – side of history. This attitude has hardened since 2017, following the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreement to prop up Theresa May’s Conservative 
government in a ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement. The chief irony here is that 
Ulster Loyalist communities are akin to the white working-class constituencies of the 
North of England and West Midlands that the British Labour Party is so concerned 
about losing in present times. They too feel disillusioned and abandoned by political 
elites. Cast on the scrap heap by deindustrialisation and angered by parliamentary 
expenses scandals, many did not use their vote except to support Brexit.i They are 
also akin to supporters of Donald Trump in the United States. They appreciate leaders 
who ‘don’t give a damn’, and are attracted by tough talk and easy scapegoats.ii The 
comparison between Trump voters and Ulster Loyalists was alluded to by civil rights 
veteran Bernadette McAliskey in a 2016 interview: 
 
As the American system disgracefully refers to some of its poorest people as 
‘white trash,’ loyalists are perceived within British nationalism as an 
underclass. Many from loyalist communities have internalized that 
themselves. When I work with people from that background I’m often 
surprised that they will set on the table first, ‘Okay, so, we know we are no 
good.’ I have talked to young loyalists who say, ‘We know we are scum.’ I 
don’t understand any human being starting a conversation saying that they are 
not human. There is a clear lack of self-esteem and also a loss of confidence.iii 
 
As in the US, Europe and Britain, the danger is this group falling prey to the far right; 
especially if working-class Protestants are repeatedly told they are already worthless 
and/or ‘fascist’. In the end, the only people sure to engage deprived Loyalist 
communities will be fascists. 
 
For many years now, there has been a debate within the British Labour Party as to 
whether it should stand candidates in Northern Ireland. Forming a judgement on that 
complex question, however, will only be possible if the British left starts to take 
Ulster Unionism seriously, listening and engaging with its concerns, history, and 
political character. Against basic principles of solidarity in the labour movement, 
there are numerous examples of entire Ulster Protestant communities being tarred 
with the same reactionary brush by voluble journalists and academics.iv Familiar 
clichés and caricatures, of ‘Protestant Unionist privilege’ and ‘communal domination 
and entitlement’ litter recent works discussing the ‘inevitability’ of a united Ireland, 
often emanating from those with British Labour Party associations.v These accounts 
not only propagate the factual inaccuracy that Protestant communities lack a left-wing 
or labour history, but often imply that Ulster Protestants lack any real ‘culture’, as in a 
literary or creative lineage that exemplifies the community’s past achievements and 
future potential. This is one of the reasons a united Ireland is apparently ‘inevitable’: 
any British-identifying culture or population is so retrograde and negligible that it 
requires washing away into a ‘new Ireland’. 
 
These two narratives – of Protestants having a regressive political history and a non-
existent cultural heritage – reinforce each other. This was demonstrated particularly 
clearly by paramilitary-turned-writer Ronan Bennett (a former parliamentary 
researcher to the current Labour Party leader), in an infamous article published just 
before the 1994 Ceasefires, entitled ‘An Irish Answer’. Bennett proclaimed that 
Protestant culture was fundamentally ‘inward-looking’ and ‘restricted to little more 
than flute bands, Orange marches and the chanting of sectarian slogans at football 
matches’.vi Bennett’s attack was a well-placed condemnation of Unionism for a 
welcoming liberal English readership, though it is a portrayal that continues to filter 
through to international coverage of Northern Ireland. Contemporary American 
visitors report that an institution such as the Londonderry Bands Forum represents ‘an 
integral part of Protestant culture’, affirming overall presentations of Ulster 
Protestants and Unionists as conservative, purely Orange, and philistine.vii 
 
Unionism and social democracy 
This is, however, an unhelpful caricature of a diverse and contested political 
constituency, with a rich cultural life, from the novels of Maurice Leitch and Jan 
Carson, to the poetry of Michael Longley and Jean Bleakney, to the painting of 
William Conor and the music of Van Morrison. Most urgently for British Labour, 
however, it reflects its ignorance of the social-democratic (and left) tradition of the 
Protestant working class of Northern Ireland.viii Especially in the period between the 
end of the Second World War and the beginnings of the Troubles in the late 1960s, 
the Protestant working class was drawn to various left-wing groupings, from the 
cross-community Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) to the Communist Party of 
Ireland (CPI). In 1962 the NILP gained four seats in the old Stormont parliament and 
over 25 per cent of the entire Northern Ireland vote (roughly what Sinn Féin gets now 
as the second largest party), with particular strongholds in Protestant working-class 
parts of north and east Belfast.ix The highest vote for any NILP Westminster election 
candidate came in 1966 for Martin McBirney in overwhelmingly-Protestant East 
Belfast.x  
 
Moreover, Unionist MPs have often allied with Labour in Westminster. A voting 
arrangement between Labour and Ulster Unionist MPs kept James Callaghan’s 
government afloat in the late-1970s, and it is often forgotten that two Unionist MPs, 
Harold McCusker and John Carson, voted with Labour in the critical 1979 vote of 
confidence in the Callaghan government (it was the abstaining vote of the SDLP MP 
for West Belfast, Gerry Fitt, that sealed its fall).  
 
Nor was the Labour-Unionist crossover confined to the 1960s and 1970s. The 2011 
intake of members for the Northern Ireland Assembly featured Unionist 
representatives such as the DUP’s Sammy Douglas and the UUP’s Michael Copeland, 
who do not hesitate to highlight their Labour-supporting backgrounds. Even the DUP 
deserves further examination in this respect, with its MPs tending to vote with the 
British Labour Party on economic issues in Westminster, including tax credits, NHS 
pay rises and tuition fees.xi Rooted in the working-class base of its founder, the DUP 
was one of several parties created in the early 1970s that hoovered up swathes of 
former NILP supporters. Though it has been described by left-leaning English 
journalists as consisting of ‘bigoted throwbacks (sic) to several centuries ago’, it has 
broadly ‘statist’ and welfarist tendencies – on behalf of its working-class constituents 
– as well as an intriguing discrepancy between councillors and membership, with 
evidence that the former prize ‘bread and butter’ issues over ‘constitutional 
grandstanding’.xii  
 
As more than one commentator has noted, Ulster Unionists often do themselves few 
political favours when it comes to presenting their case to the outside world.xiii 
Essentially, because mainstream Irish nationalist parties employ the language of 
progressive causes, many Unionists have responded by embracing an opposing 
conservative mantle, meaning that they have now come to actively negate their own 
left-wing history. On 5 May 2018, Councillor Dale Pankhurst of the DUP tweeted his 
disgust at the sight of Sinn Féin member and former Provisional IRA prisoner James 
McVeigh appearing on a trade union demonstration in Belfast. Pankhurst commented 
how it was ‘Hard enough for Protestants to engage with trade unions given their 
history of anti-Unionist socialism’ (sic), but that the presence of the Sinn Féin man 
made it ‘unsurprising why Protestants stay away’.xiv  
 
Pankhurst’s distortion of history illustrates how Unionists and Loyalists often 
function as their own worst enemy, happily confirming their opponents’ political 
lines. Indeed, rather than locating the broadest and most progressive concepts of 
Britishness, Unionists by their own admission tend to focus on ‘flag-waving and 
worn-out mantra-chanting’.xv Rather than celebrate actual bastions of Britishness like 
the National Health Service, mainstream Unionists focus on the armed forces, the 
Royal Family, and the Union Jack: a Britishness that faded in the eyes of many 
English, Welsh and Scottish people some decades ago. Similarly, Unionism has not 
distinguished itself when in office. It is galling for its adherents to be reminded that 
one of the Provisional IRA’s main outlined aims was to make Northern Ireland 
‘ungovernable except by colonial military rule’.xvi Arguably, the last three years have 
shown that Ulster Unionists have themselves made Northern Ireland ‘ungovernable’, 
through their incompetent mismanagement of devolved political departments, refusal 
to compromise with opponents, and – in the case of the Renewable Heat Incentive 
scandal that came to light in late-2016 – high-scale corruption and rank cronyism.xvii 
The main party of Ulster Unionism has achieved ungovernability without armed Irish 
Republicans firing a shot. 
 
The dangers of condescension 
While official ‘Unionism’ wastes its energies on symbolic battles and obstructionism, 
working-class Protestants associated with the ‘loyalist’ tradition appear stranded, 
disillusioned, and restless once more as the Brexit wheels turn. The term ‘Loyalism’ 
began to be used in the early-1970s to distinguish Loyalists pejoratively from 
Unionists: as working-class men who committed acts of violence, contrasting with 
‘respectable’ middle-class Unionists.xviii And while the class location of Loyalism 
shaped its capacity for violence, it also inflected its politics in a left-wing direction. A 
brief survey of the leadership and members of Loyalist paramilitary groups during the 
Troubles reveals working-class Labour supporters or trade union members. Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA) leaders Glen Barr and John McMichael regularly 
discussed their left-leaning politics, as did Gusty Spence, William ‘Plum’ Smith and 
David Ervine on the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) side.xix All described themselves 
as socialists, either in public pronouncements or interviews. All had connections to 
Belfast (or in Barr’s case, Derry) working-class cultures of trade unionism and left 
politics.  
 
Loyalist policy documents – of the kind some academics denied Loyalists were ever 
capable of makingxx – such as the Principles of Loyalism (2002) lauded the ‘multi-
cultural and multi-ethnic pluralist society’ of the modern United Kingdom. This 
treatise also highlighted  socialist influences on Loyalism such as the late Belfast 
councillor Hugh Smyth and the NILP’s Reverend John Stewart.xxi On the UDA side, 
Supreme Commander Andy Tyrie confirmed in a 1980 interview ‘I lean towards 
socialism, yes’, and complained how the conflict meant that ‘normal politics’ never 
developed in Northern Ireland: ‘I believe that the bulk of both communities here are 
Labour-minded people. Or even socialist-minded people. They don’t want things to 
be done by people who’ve been born with a silver spoon in their mouth giving them 
special privileges.’xxii This strain of left-Loyalist class politics, while reduced, 
continues on through the Progressive Unionist Party, which was founded in 1979 and 
adopted (and retained) British Labour’s original Clause IV in its own constitution. It 
remains one of the few local parties that supports the extension of the 1967 Abortion 
Act to Northern Ireland. 
 
This is hardly to say that Loyalism is straightforwardly or uniformly progressive. 
Notwithstanding its decidedly regressive propensity for paramilitary violence, former 
UVF combatant and current PUP leader Billy Hutchinson noted how in Long Kesh 
prison he talked socialist politics while the UDA’s John White extolled free market 
Thatcherite views.xxiii Loyalism leans – like many ideologies – to both the left and 
right, yet the latter has been disproportionately covered in journalism and academic 
writing. Researchers on the Protestant working class should start moving beyond 
conventional Unionist and Loyalist staples to take in areas of history that are less 
reactionary and well-known. The community’s social-democratic history is one such 
area, which with few exceptions has not been properly reflected in scholarly literature.  
 
A constituency that nobody wants 
British Labour’s difficulties in understanding and listening to the Protestant working 
class are shared by local parties. Sinn Féin is by its nature hostile to this constituency, 
despite the founding father of modern Irish Republicanism Wolfe Tone’s famous wish 
to unite ‘Catholic, Protestant and dissenter’.xxiv The SDLP once harboured hopes of 
being a non-sectarian force that would transcend the north’s tribal politics, but once 
individual leaders committed to this philosophy left the party in the late-1970s, it 
became a mainly Catholic and middle-class nationalist party, with conservative 
attitudes on social issues. It lost its Westminster seats in June 2017, and earlier this 
year agreed a partnership with the centre-right Fianna Fáil party in Irish politics (a 
massive sign to British Labour that it should not regard the SDLP as its natural ‘sister’ 
party anymore). The non-sectarian Alliance Party is a pro-business party that has gone 
in search of votes from the expanding Catholic electorate, and so has antagonised 
working-class Loyalists through its voting patterns on city councils across Northern 
Ireland; most notably during the ‘Flag Protests’ of 2012-13, which blew up following 
Belfast City Council’s decision to restrict the flying of the Union Jack outside City 
Hall. Alliance’s compromise motion sealed the deal back then, and its strong 
performance in the local elections of May 2019 is sure to alarm Loyalists even further 
(it is a measure of Loyalism’s weakness that it is concerned by the mild gains of a 
centrist party, which offers compromise motions at municipal level). 
 Only the radical left-wing grouping People Before Profit, particularly through its 
activists in Derry, has shown any willingness to engage Protestant working-class 
communities, setting up public meetings addressing this section of the population and 
participating in cultural and political events in Protestant working-class districts such 
as the Fountain estate (which was the subject of petrol bomb attacks from nationalist 
youths in the summer of 2018).xxv Though this engagement may appear at times to be 
largely rhetorical, and there are still a few too many references to left Republican 
icons such as James Connolly, the simple aspiration to address a group so often 
avoided is commendable.   
 
As during the Troubles, trade unions in Northern Ireland play a valuable role in 
promoting working-class solidarity across communities. A recent publication edited 
by two trade unionists highlights the Protestant Unionist strain of left-wing politics 
via the underrated figure of William Walker (1870–1918), who argued that socialists 
in Ireland should realise their political aspirations through the British labour 
movement.xxvi This was less a call for the British Labour Party to organise in Northern 
Ireland than it was a reminder of a radical, constitutionally British perspective that 
Ulster Unionists could potentially connect with. Similarly, back in February 2014, the 
International Brigade Commemoration Committee unveiled a plaque in the Shankill 
Road Library to seven volunteers from this working-class Protestant area who fought 
alongside Catholics on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. However, in 
present times even the anti-sectarian ethos of the trade union movement, hard-won 
and taking years to build, is facing new challenges. At the end of February 2019, over 
one hundred and fifty Irish activists signed a declaration calling for Irish unity under 
the banner of ‘Trade Unionists for a New and United Ireland’ (TUNUI) and held two 
events launching the initiative in Dublin and then Belfast.xxvii Many northern trade 
unionists fear this will split and possibly break the movement, which had maintained a 
neutral stand on the constitutional issue during the Troubles and so maintained cross-
community cohesion. Organisations such as the Belfast Trades Council and the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions set up distress funds, initiated anti-sectarian training 
programmes in the workplace (through units like Counteract), released statements 
condemning violence, and promoted (and directly facilitated) dialogue between 
opposing factions.xxviii The TUNUI declaration, on the other hand, is likely to prompt 
a ‘Best with Britain’ counter-group emerging – unsurprisingly, given that Sinn Féin 
activists are driving the agitation, which was received with predictable encouragement 
on social media from the same British authors who talk of the ‘inevitability’ of a 
united Ireland – the vanguard of those who have little or zero knowledge of the labour 
movement in Ireland and its Protestant working-class contingent.xxix 
 
Brexit and Labour’s neutrality 
In May 2018, the current Labour leadership encouragingly reaffirmed the party’s 
commitment to remaining neutral in any border poll, appearing (in marked contrast to 
the Conservative Party) to uphold the bipartisan background of the Good Friday 
Agreement.xxx But the crisis unleased by Brexit has produced a welter of new 
literature on the prospects for Irish unification, usually advancing classic demographic 
arguments about Catholics overtaking Protestants on account of the birth-rate, often 
authored by individuals previously or presently attached to the British Labour 
Party.xxxi In a roundabout way this indicates that the main opposition to Irish unity is 
unlikely to emanate in the long run from the UK. The principal opposition will 
probably emerge from Irish citizens facing a huge taxation hike across an all-Ireland 
economy in order to be able to afford taking on the six counties, along with a potential 
serious security problem of some kind of Loyalist rebellion.xxxii  
 
Instead of speculating on how this might all pan out, however, those British left-
wingers who do turn their attention to Ireland should consult the actual history of 
Ulster Unionism and working-class Protestantism, re-adjusting their settings to a more 
nuanced analysis of Northern Ireland. Labour needs to recognise that Northern 
Ireland’s urgent problems of poverty, austerity, Brexit, and the breakdown of the 
devolved institutions can’t be addressed without respectful engagement with this vital 
political constituency. The party’s role is not to sit and wait for Northern Irish 
Unionism to be washed away by the tide of history, but to encourage it to recover and 
advance its best political traditions. There needs to be a little less listening to voices 
from an Irish nationalist comfort zone, and more respect and solidarity shown to those 
who share many of Labour’s values in what remains, wanted or not, a part of the UK.  
 
Connal Parr is a lecturer in History at Northumbria University. 
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